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THE BRITISH NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE WEST 
INDIES, 1650-1700 

A STUDY IN NAVAL ADMINISTRATION 



By Robert W. Neeser 



Reprinted from the 

United States Naval Institute Proceedings 

Vol. 40, No. 6, Whole No. 154 

Nov.-Dec, 1914 



UNITED STATES 
NAVAL INSTITUTE 

PROCEEDINGS 



Vol.40, No. 6 NOV.-DEC, 1914 Whole No. 154 

[copteighted] 

U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS, MD. 



THE BRITISH NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE WEST 

INDIES, 1650- 1 700' 

A STUDY IN NAVAL ADMINISTRATION 

By Robert W. Neeser 



The operations of the British Navy in West Indian waters 
during the latter half of the seventeenth century are not an un- 
known page of Colonial history. The fleet engagements, expedi- 
tions, and single-ship actions, all have been described time and 
again ; but they have, for the most part, been treated only as a 
series of isolated and independent facts, with no relation to each 
other or to the more important events of the period. Rarely have 
historians sought to discover the underlying causes for the out- 
come of the events which they recounted and for which they dis- 
tributed praise and blame among the commanders. Yet these 
very causes often spelled disaster long before an enemy was 
sighted, and mismanagement in the administration at homxC, lack 
of preparation, inferiority of persbnnel, and mediocrity of 
material, all, at some time, proved obstacles which the abilities of 
even the best captains were powerless to overcome. 

From the point of view of the naval student, the chief interest 
of the operations of this period lies in the light which they throw 

^ Submitted in competition for prize essay, 1914, and accepted for publi- 
cation. 



i6oo British Naval Operations in the West Indies 

upon the administrative history of the Royal Navy. The expedi- 
tions sent to the West Indies were curious affairs, and notable 
examples of the manner in which the navy was run. Their his- 
tory is a repetition, truly amazing, of a series of gross mis- 
carriages, in which those in authority at home betrayed incredible 
ignorance of the condition of affairs in the plantations. Effort 
after effort was made to drive the French and Spanish from 
American waters. Expeditions by the score were sent out in the 
hope of effecting some important conquest, but the vessels were 
never despatched except in driblets, too few to produce the slight- 
est impression, too late for the purposes for which they were 
destined, and the result was nothing short of a series of reverses 
that make one wonder how the British ever had the courage to try 
again (i). 

In order to understand the underlying causes of these repeated 
failures, it may be well perhaps to consider the manner in which 
the service was at this time governed. Then only can we realize 
how the things came to be as they were. 

During the period of the Commonwealth and Protectorate the 
entire administration of the navy was assumed by Parliament 
through an Admiralty Council of State, assisted by a board called 
the Committee of the Navy and Customs, whose functions were 
chiefly financial, and another body known as the Commissioners of 
the Navy, upon whom fell the brunt of administrative responsibil- 
ity (2). With the Restoration, however, these commissions were 
dissolved. The old system of the monarchy, instituted by Henry 
VIII, in 1546, was revived under the control of the Duke of York, 
as Lord High Admiral, and the management of the navy was once 
more vested in a board of civil officers, known as the Four 
Principal Officers, and later as the Navy Board (3), who acted 
as the Lord High Admiral's Council of Advice insofar as 
matters of government were concerned. Theoretically they ex- 
isted only to carry out his instructions, but in practice they really 
enjoyed great administrative powers (4). Their duties were 
outlined at length in the Duke's orders. In their corporate 
capacity as the Navy Board, their business was to contract for the 
necessary stores and materials for the service, to superintend the 
supply of victuals, to pay the seamen and workmen, and to recom- 
mend persons for vacancies in the inferior offices. In addition to 
these functions, which they discharged at their weekly meetings 

Gift 

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British Naval Operations in the West Indies 1601 

at the Navy Office in Seething Lane and Crutched Friars, the 
Principal Officers were called upon to perform certain depart- 
mental duties. The treasurer, as his title shows, was held respon- 
sible for the financial management of the navy; he drew up the 
estimates, obtained the necessary funds from the Lord High 
Treasurer of England, and made a yearly report to the Lord 
High Admiral on the state of the departments. The surveyor 
prepared the estimates of the stores required by the navy, reported 
on the condition of the dockyards and of the King's ships in 
service and the repairs needed by them; he was also required to 
see that the prices paid for supplies were reasonable, and to make 
an annual survey of all the ships of the navy. The comptroller 
was supposed to act as a check upon both the treasurer and the 
surveyor; he superintended all the payments made by the board, 
kept a record of all moneys advanced, of all estimates, and of 
privy seals, reported annually to the Lord High Admiral, and 
watched his brother officers. The clerk of the navy, or clerk of 
the acts, answered to the permanent under secretary of the 
present time. He was the head of the office work, attended the 
meetings of the board, kept minutes of its transactions, and saw 
to it that the " plurality of persons was proposed for the supply 
of all wants." But his range of interest did not end here. No 
matter appears to have been too minute or insignificant to escape 
his attention, and the records show that everything from ship- 
building and the preservation of timber for the navy to the actual 
discipline and management of the service was personally looked 
into by him (5). 

Elaborate provisions are found in the Duke's orders for pre- 
venting fraud, and every care was taken to check the sins of one 
man by the vigilance of another. The task of reform, however, 
was not an easy one (6). Corruption was then an evil of long 
standing. Even had the code of honor been higher, it is doubtful 
whether it would have been possible to check the waste and mis- 
management. A proper supervision may have been possible in 
1638, when the Earl of Northumberland issued his instructions 
for coping with a similar problem, but since that time the navy had 
so grown that it was beyond the power of the Four Principal 
Officers personally to superintend every detail of their office. 
Much that was expected of them personally had to be left to sub- 
ordinates, who in turn could do nothing without orders from their 



i6o2 British Naval Operations in the West Indies 

superiors (7). Consequently when it came to the fixing of 
responsibihty a serious difficulty arose. No one was really 
answerable. Divided control meant divided responsibility, and 
that in turn meant no responsibility, or, at least, one very hard to 
fix. 

Beneath these four great officers were a number of lesser 
officials who were not members of the board, such as the store- 
keeper, the clerk of the cheque, the clerk of the ropeyard, and the 
clerk of the survey. But as business increased and the work grew 
more complex other officers and boards sprang up, who took up 
the duties thrown off from the principal offices. In the course of 
a century, altogether 13 departments came into existence, no two 
of which were under the same roof. At this period the Navy 
Office was in Seething Lane and Crutched Friars ; the Navy Pay 
Office, in Old Broad Street ; the Victualling Office, at the end of 
East Smithfield ; the Board for Sick and Wounded, on Tower 
Hill ; the Treasurer's Office, in Leadenhall Street ; the Board of 
Transport, near Seething Lane; the Prize Office, in York Build- 
ings; the Chest, in Chatham; and Greenwich Hospital, at Green- 
wich (8). 

A further cause for confusion is found in the fact that even all 
these parts of the administrative machinery did not suffice for 
equipping and managing the navy. Other branches of the govern- 
ment also were depended upon and they likewise were scattered 
over every part of London. The Board of Ordnance was in the 
Tower ; the War Office, at Whitehall ; the Commissioners of Cus- 
toms, on Thames Street ; the Lord High Treasurer, in the palace 
at Whitehall ; the Post Office, in Bishopsgate, Brydges Street, or 
Lombard Street; the Board of Trade and Plantations, in the 
Cockpit ; and Apothecaries Hall, on the east side of Blackf riars. 

The government of the navy by the Four Principal Officers 
acting under the Lord High Admiral continued until July, 1673, 
when the authority of the Duke of York was overthrown by the 
passage of the Test Act. The administration now underwent a 
great chailge. The office of the Lord High Admiral still continued 
to exist, but its powers were restricted. The King practically 
reserved for himself the control of afifairs, the disposal of offices 
and places, and the collection of the Admiralty dues (9). At the 
same time, July 9, Lords Commissioners were appointed under 
the great seal to execute the office of the Lord High Admiral of 



British Naval Operations in the West Indies 1603 

England, left vacant by the resignation of the Duke of York ( 10) . 
Their meetings began on the 19th of July, 1673, and were held 
three times a week, later twice a week, at the Council Chamber, 
the business of the navy abundantly calling for it (11). From 
its inception this new body showed considerable administrative 
ability and did its work energetically and effectively, though 
greatly handicapped by the usual lack of funds. 

There were now, then, two boards — the Admiralty Board and 
the Navy Board — the one executive and military, the other civil 
and administrative; the one nominally superior, the other, with 
the prestige of age and political power, practically independent. 
The result was divided control, and consequent antagonism be- 
tween the two.* 

One happy appointment in this year of upheavals, however, was 
that of Samuel Pepys to the newly created and influential posi- 
tion of Secretary to the King and the Commission " in the affairs 
of the Admiralty of England." The choice was inevitable, for 
Pepys was the one person in the country best acquainted with 
the workings of the management of the navy, having been, since 
1660, clerk of the acts (12). 

Thus the administration continued for the next seven years. 
The King, with assistance of the Duke of York, who, though ex- 
cluded from office by the Test Act, still enjoyed a sort of formal 
control, endeavored to exercise his prerogative, in the hope that 
some day his brother might be restored to power as Lord High 
Admiral. But that was not to be. The discovery of the Popish 
plot worked the country into such paroxysms of madness that the 
Duke was obliged to flee to the Netherlands. Pepys also lost his 
post on a charge of being a convert. Even the commissioners 
were dismissed. No one was now left at Whitehall at all ac- 

" An instance- is to be found in the case of the agent appointed by the 
Lords of the Admiralty in the West Indies to furnish provisions and 
supplies to the ships-of-war of the Royal Navy, whom the Commissioners 
of the Navy suddenly deprived of his authority, with the result that no one 
was left to supply the wants of the men-of-war. The merchants would 
not furnish the money, lest on contradictory orders the bills would not be 
paid. Governor Beeston finally wrote to the Board of Trade, complaining 
that H. B. M. S. Hampshire had been in port nearly two years, but that 
neither men nor stores nor provisions had been sent out for her and that ' 
she was in consequence nearly spoiled. (Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.), 
1696-7, No. loi.) 

62 



i6o4 British Naval Operations in the West Indies 

quainted with administering the service. The office of Lord High 
Admiral and the Navy Office were both suspended. The result 
of these wholesale changes was an organization such as had ruled 
the navy for Charles I, after the death of the Duke of Bucking- 
ham, in 1628 — a commission vested with all the powers heretofore 
granted to two separate boards. But the appointments were most 
injudicious. None of the members chosen had had any previous 
experience to fit them for the gigantic task that lay before them. 
All were " wholly ignorant " of naval affairs. Under their control 
the service was all but destroyed. The effective force was re- 
duced, probably on account of lack of funds, and what ships were 
kept in service were allowed to decay owing to neglect and 
waste (13). In five years the number in commission fell from 
76^ large ships to 24 small ones, and the latter all " in harbor and 
so far out of repair " as to require the sum of no less than £120,000 
to fit them for service (14) ! 

Fortunately this state of affairs did not continue for too long a 
period. The commission of 1679 was revoked by patent dated 
19 May, 1684, and the office of the Lord High Admiral resumed 
by the King, just before his death, with the advice of " his royal 
brother, the Duke of York" (15). About the same time the 
" office of secretary for the affairs of the Admiralty of England " 
was formally established by letters patent under the great seal, and 
Pepys, who had been living in retirement, was appointed to this 
influential position. But Charles II died before anything could 
be done to better the condition of the navy. The fleet was indeed 
in a deplorable condition. The debt amounted to £384,000; old 
ships were decayed and unfit for service, and new ones still un- 
completed, though the money for their construction had already 
been supplied; and stores and supplies of every description were 
wanting at the dockyards ( 16) . Strong measures were imperative, 
otherwise the fate of the navy was sealed. The King bestirred 
himself, and, though he did none of the work himself, appointed 
to office the men best able to restore order out of anarchy. A 
special Board of Commissioners in quality of principal officers of 
the navy were appointed in April, 1686, with all the powers vested 
in former commissions (17). This marked a return to the system 
of 1673. During their incumbency the new officers brought the 
navy into a high state of efficiency, but they could not succeed in 
correcting all the evils brought about by so many years of mis- 
management (18). 



British Naval Operations in the West Indies 1605 

In addition to the evils and defects already noted, several other 
causes contributed to the failures of these successive adminis- 
trative reforms. Foremost among these were the financial diffi- 
culties in which the government repeatedly found itself. Under 
the Commonwealth a liberal policy was indulged in for a time, 
but within four years, 1649 to 1654, such demands had been made 
upon the Treasury that the service was badly crippled (19). The 
restored monarchy consequently found itself burdened with the 
indebtedness of the interregnum, which, in November, 1659, was 
estimated at £722,000. As early as July, 1660, Pepys noted that 
the navy was in a very sad condition for want of funds, and this 
condition instead of improving became more and more serious 
as time went on. So enormous were the arrears, that in March, 
1665-1666, over £2,500,000 were needed to pay the victuallers and 
provide supplies for the current year, whereas the available funds 
for this purpose amounted to but half that sum! Indeed at one 
time Pepys doubted whether even five ships could have been sent 
out without great difficulty. It is not surprising then that the 
people were reluctant to trust the government and refused to 
furnish supplies for the navy in spite of the good payments 
promised (20). 

" Personal and particular failings " are also mentioned by Pepys 
among his reasons for the failure of the administration to accom- 
plish more. The Navy Board in its corporate capacity failed 
lamentably in the discharge of its duties ; the treasurer was 
charged with a general remissness in executing his office; the 
comptroller had neglected to keep his accounts and to " comptroll " 
properly the treasurer and the victualler ; while the surveyor had 
not only failed to present the reports required of him, but had 
besides actually committed the most important functions of his 
office to " under-officers " (21). 

Among the officers afloat, also, negle.ct and inattention to their 
duties were noticeable. A serious feud between the tarpaulins, 
the genuine seamen, and court gentlemen distracted the service. 
As Macaulay aptly stated the question : " There were seamen and 
there were gentlemen in the navy of Charles II, but the seamen 
were not gentlemen and the gentlemen were not seamen." Neither 
got along with the other, nor could they apparently succeed with- 
out each other. Sir Anthony Deane lamented that he could not 
help feeling contempt for the " gentlemen commanders who must 



i6o6 British Naval Operations in the West Indies 

have all their effeminate accommodations for pomp; and that it 
all would be the ruin of our fleets if such persons were continued 
in command, they having neither experience nor being capable 
of learning, because they would not submit to the fatigue and 
inconvenience which those who bred seamen would undergo." 
" Bethink yourself," he wrote, " what sort of sea captains the 
honor and safety of the crown and government will have to rely 
upon for support at sea, when the few commanders (for God 
knows they are but few) that are now surviving of the true 
breed shall be worn out " (22) . 

The Revolution of 1688 brought no considerable changes in the 
mere administration of the navy. Its influence was in another 
direction, and in this it affected the sea service as deeply as it did 
the rest of the nation. Parliament was now the dominating body. 
Court favor and the influence of favorites no longer secured the 
best commands. It was through Parliament that promotions were 
now earned, and, what was still more important, by Parliament 
that pay was supplied. Improvement resulted from this change. 
The sea service became sharply distinguished from the army. 
Previously men not infrequently served on both land and sea. 
But the army now drew to it the gentlemen volunteers who 
formerly had been in the fleets of Charles II, and the-navy was 
left to the sole care of the tarpaulins who had been bred to the sea 
and were willing to endure its hardships. The purely technical 
part, the handling of the ships, was now done better than before, 
but the good seamen were not necessarily good fighting men, and 
the change involved a fall in the purely military spirit that, with- 
out a doubt, was a great misfortune (23). 

Such was then the administration to which the country looked 
for the management of its fleets and squadrons. It was a form 
of government that developed with the growth of the navy itself, 
an administration devised to meet the exigencies of the times. 
Historically, its institution and development were essentially a 
civil process, the purpose of which was to provide a national sea 
force for war. But that very civil branch, the Navy Board, in 
the course of years became so powerful through its political 
associations as to get out of harmony with the Admiralty, which 
was charged with the responsibility of waging successful war with 
the means furnished by the lesser board. Opposition between the 
civil and military branches consequently was born with the very in- 



British Naval Operations in the West Indies 1607 

ception of the Royal Navy's Administration, and it was only when 
the Navy Board was abolished in 1830, when its duties were dis- 
tributed among the members of the Board of Admiralty, that the 
organization became logical and effective. Until then matters 
went on much as before, and the same errors were committed 
time and again. It is interesting to see how the system worked 
out in practice. 

The condition of the island possessions in the West Indies and 
in the Caribbean, which England was striving to retain at this 
period, was far from enviable. Surrounded by French and 
Spanish settlements, they were continually embroiled in the cur- 
rent European wars, and a prey to the hordes of buccaneers and 
pirates that infested the Antilles. Never were they secure from 
attack ; never were their merchant fleets certain of reaching their 
destinations unless convoyed by men-of-war; dependent upon the 
mother country and their New England neighbors for their very 
subsistence, they lived in continual dread lest this supply should 
be interrupted (24) . How greatly in need of protection then were 
they, and how modest their demands upon the government at 
home ! A frigate or two, or a fireship, was usually all they asked ; 
and surely no more than they received (25). The question 
naturally arises why so few vessels were allowed them in their 
dire need, for a dire need it really was. Could the vessels not be 
spared from home waters, or was it neglect and indifference on the 
part of the authorities in London? True, the events in the West 
Indies were only of very minor importance compared to the 
operations which the British fleets were carrying on in the English 
Channel — the two conflicts with Holland and the wars of the 
League of Augsburg and of the Spanish Succession— which com- 
pelled the King to center his forces about his own shores. But the 
repeated efforts made to secure the command of the sea in the 
West Indies at this period were far too numerous for us to believe 
that great importance was not attached to the results it was hoped 
these expeditions would bring about. 

It cannot be denied that the officials at home, enjoying the ease 
of their lucrative political posts, were directly responsible for the 
disasters that followed one another so rapidly. They could not 
understand the true state of affairs as they existed in the planta- 
tions ; they would not. The story that follows reveals the scene 
beyond question. But, then, there was also another answer to the 



i6o8 British Naval Operations in the West Indies 

question; an answer that had to be sought elsewhere — in the 
plantations themselves — for the difficulties which the governors 
and their subjects experienced in obtaining aid from England 
were as nothing compared to the hopeless task of trying to keep 
in service the few ships with which they had, perchance, been 
supplied. For there was not a place in the islands where these 
ships might refit or repair damages (26) ; no men available to 
refill their depleted crews ; no guns to arm them ; no way of obtain- 
ing supplies and provisions even for short cruises, as the planters 
seldom would spare any or else refused to sell their products in 
exchange for valueless pursers' bills (27). And lastly, there was 
the serious question of the tropical climate which played so im- 
portant a role, as ships never could stay in those waters more than 
a season without losing so many of their men that barely enough 
would be left to navigate them back to England (28) . 

One of the first services for which the navy was employed 
by the Council of State after the close of the Civil War was to 
stamp out what royalist sentiment still existed in England's out- 
lying possessions in the West Indies. The despatch of a fleet to 
Barbados was therefore considered early in December of the 
year 1650, and the Committee of Barbados received instructions 
to prepare for this purpose. Sir George Ayscue was the Council 
of State's choice for the command of this squadron, and the 
Committee of the Navy were directed to pay him the necessary 
sums to defray the contingencies of a fleet. By the last week of 
January, 165 1, the Committee of the Navy was able to report on 
the strength of " The Barbados Fleet " which should be sent out, 
and the Council of State instructed them to attend to this matter 
at once. But delays occurred which put to stop to all expeditions. 
Ayscue never received his instructions till the middle of February; 
two months later the question of victualling the fleet was yet un- 
settled; and the Council of State still considering the "business 
concerning the fleet." The vessels were now at Plymouth, where 
they had been ordered to await further instructions previous to 
sailing, when suddenly came orders for part of them to repair to 
the Scilly Islands. Everything had now to be done over again. 
The Council of State proceeded immediately to give instructions 
for the fitting out of new ships. Four were ordered victualled 
for nine months, the Committee of the Navy were required to see 
that the wishes of Parliament were faithfully carried out, and 



British Naval Operations in the West Indies '1609 

Sir George Ayscue was directed to proceed on his voyage as soon 
as possible. This was on the 20th of June. Within the next week, 
however, reports came to the Council of State which caused an 
investigation into the seaworthiness of the vessels chosen for this 
service, which finally influenced the Council again to change its 
orders and recall the vessels employed off the Scilly Islands in 
order that they might be fitted out as originally intended. Two 
weeks more were spent in preparations; then came the long 
awaited supplies of ordnance, and finally on the 5th of August, 
1 65 1, the expedition sailed. The coasts of Portugal and Spain 
were first visited in a vain search for Prince Rupert's squadron, 
after which the vessels headed for Barbados. Calms and light 
winds, however, greatly delayed the passage, so that it was not 
until the middle of October that they made their appearance in 
those waters. The island was not the least prepared for a long 
resistance. Nevertheless, Governor Willoughby resolved to hold 
out as long as possible, and in this decision he was ably supported 
by the planters, until the effective blockade established by Ayscue 
convinced them of the hopelessness of further resistance and the 
island capitulated (29). 

Over two years elapsed before another force was despatched 
to American waters. Lawless violence had reached such a stage 
that the government no longer could allow the urgent appeals 
from the English settlements to remain unheeded. A large force 
was therefore organized during the summer and fall of 1654 to 
bring relief to the oppressed planters (30), and operate against 
the Spanish, French and Dutch, in retaliation for their aggressions 
on English trade. Thirty-eight ships-of-war, carrying 1134 guns, 
4380 seamen, and 3000 troops, were proposed for this service 
under the joint leadership of Admiral William Penn and General 
Robert Venables. This selection of leaders, however, proved 
unfortunate from the very start. Troubles arose almost immedi- 
ately ; the two commanders could not agree ; they quarreled even 
before the expedition sailed ; and, to make the situation still worse, 
they found themselves continually opposed by a committee which 
Cromwell, following the practice of Parliament, had also placed in 
charge of the expedition. But this was not all that boded ill for 
success. None of the troops were seasoned, their numbers far 
below the stated figures, and besides the victualling had been very 
badly done — possibly because of the poverty of the administra- 



i6io British Naval Operations in the West Indies 

tion — what few stores obtained were found to be defective, and 
the greater part could not be prepared in time and had to follow 
the ships at a later date. 

Toward the close of December, 1654, Rear Admiral Dakins was 
finally despatched in advance with 14 ships. The main squadron 
followed five days later, but many of the vessels were such dull 
sailers that Penn and Venables left them behind and pressed on 
with the rest to Carlisle Bay, in Barbados, which had been desig- 
nated as the rendezvous. There the whole armament assembled 
on the last day of January, 1655. When the expedition was 
planned its leaders had hoped for active co-operation from the 
planters of the islands. But in this they were destined to be dis- 
appointed. However anxious the islanders may have been for the 
government to protect them, they were exceedingly loath to take 
any measures for their own defence or to aid the expedition in any 
way, so that it was only with the greatest difficulty, that a single 
regiment was raised from among them. 

Two months were spent at Barbados when the time might 
have been more profitably devoted to attacking the Spaniards 
before they had had the opportunity of strengthening their de- 
fence. On the last day of March the expedition at last got under 
way, and, after two weeks cruising, arrived oflf the island of San 
Domingo. The troops were immediately landed for an advance 
upon the town. But they were badly led, ill-armed, undisciplined, 
without supplies and water, and suflfered every hardship in the 
tropical climate. The attack was a hopeless failure, an uncon- 
trollable panic seized the whole army, and the rout became com- 
plete. The officers were thoroughly cowed by this disaster, and 
the men in no mood to attempt anything more. But something 
had to be done to escape reproach of failure. Fortunately the 
thinly populated and defenceless island of Jamaica, belonging- 
then to the Spaniards, furnished the leaders with the desired prize, 
and thither they at once took themselves (31). 

The failure of this expedition left the English settlements in a 
pitiable state and at the mercy of enemies whom they now, more 
than ever before, had reason to fear." Appeals for help became 
more and more frequent. By 1666 St. Christopher had fallen, and 
the Governor of Barbados wrote that, unless the enemy's advance 
was stopped immediately, all the islands would be lost (32). Yet 
the administration at home was slow to appreciate the gravity of 



British Naval Operations in the West Indies i6ii 

the situation; an occasional vessel-of-war was sent out, but that 
was all/ so that the settlers soon realized that it was futile to 
depend upon the King's ships. Consequently they set about 
taking measures in self-defence. The danger of attack forced 
upon the English governors the policy of encoiiraging buccaneers. 
Letters of marque were conferred upon all who would wage war 
against the Spaniards, and there is little doubt that these new 
allies did much to save the islands for the English (33). 

The outbreak of hostilities with Holland and the alliance of the 
French King with the Dutch in 1666 introduced a new element 
into the war in the Antilles. Heretofore all had worked pretty 
harmoniously against the common enemy, the Spaniards ; now 
the situation was changed, and the English were obliged to face 
also their former allies. A French fleet soon appeared among 
the West India Islands, Montserrat and Antigua were compelled 
to surrender, and St. Christopher was taken possession of almost 
as easily (34). The news of these successes of the enemy stirred 
the government of London to make an effort at least to relieve the 
plantations. Ten ships, mostly merchant vessels pressed into 
service and fitted for war purposes, were immediately ordered to 
sail under Captain Sir John Berry. They were expected to inflict 
great damage on the enemy, but the French were found to be 
already in such force that all the English could do was to keep 
them at bay until reenforcements should arrive. These came in 
the following month, in June, 1667, under Sir John Harman (35), 
who at once proceeded to inaugurate an energetic offensive cam- 
paign. The French commander, M. de la Barre, however, did not 
wait for him. The news that the two English forces had effected 
a junction apparently was all that was needed to overawe the 
enemy; they left to the English the command of the sea, and 
sought refuge under the guns of their forts at Martinique. Har- 
man had hoped first to retake St. Christopher, but as he had no 
troops to co-operate with him, he was obliged to confine his 
operations to the sea. He therefore proceeded in search of the 
French admiral and found him anchored in the road of St. Pierre 
under the guns of his shore batteries. Undaunted by the strength 
of this position, Harman began a series of attacks which lasted 

'In the years 1661 and 1662 only four king's ships cruised in the West 
Indies, and then for short periods only. See Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.), 
1661-68. 



i6i2 British Naval Operations in the West Indies 

from June 29 until July 6. After these unsuccessful attempts, the 
English fleet finally forced the passage (36). A fireship was 
ranged alongside the French flagship, and she and three other 
vessels were reduced to ashes. The conflagration threatened to 
spread to the rest of the fleet. A panic seized their crews. All 
seemed lost. But at that moment the wind shifted. The French 
once more took heart, and by heroic efforts saved the day. The 
English, discouraged by this unexpected resistance, retired and 
thereby lost a complete victory. Had they pressed home the attack 
nothing could have checked them. As it was, a great disaster 
had been inflicted upon the French. It was not the overwhelming 
victory claimed by the English reports. But the control of the sea 
did thereafter pass to them and commerce became impossible for 
their rivals. The peace of Breda, signed on July 31, 1667, brought 
hostilities to a close and restored the status ante bellum as far as 
the islands were concerned. Harman, however, remained in the 
West Indies six months longer to give the necessary protection 
to the homeward-bound trade, and then, having accomplished all 
that had been expected of him, returned to England with a great 
convoy. 

When hostilities broke out again in 1688 the home government's 
attention was once more attracted to its possessions in the West 
Indies through its desire of reducing the more important islands 
belonging to its enemies. Orders were therefore despatched to 
the officers commanding in those waters to harass the French 
as much as possible until reenf orcements could be sent out. This 
proposal received the approval of the King, April 26, 1689, and 
the Lords of Trade and Plantations at once proceeded to fit out 
the necessary force. They first consulted with the Commissioners 
of the Admiralty (May 2), who submitted a list of ships that might 
be hired for the service and which might be ready in three weeks. 
Two weeks later came another account of ships to be sent out, this 
time from the Navy Commissioners. In the meantime, through 
the co-operation of the War Office and the Board of Ordnance, 
a regiment of infantry had been raised * and equipped to accom- 
pany the expedition. The Lords of Trade, however, had not yet 
heard from the Admiralty where the troops should embark or how 
many the ships would hold. So a further delay occurred until 

. *"For a description of the novel manner in which this was done, cf. 
Fortescue, The British Army, 1783- 1802 (Macmillan, 1905), page 5. 



British Naval Operations in the West Indies 1613 

this information could be obtained. In due time it came, but in a 
manner as astounding as it was unexpected. The Admiralty, with . 
characteristic independence, had discharged practically all the 
ships hired for the expedition, having decided to use in their place 
vessels of the Royal Navy ; but as these were still at sea with the . 
fleet, they really could not say when the West India squadron 
would be ready to sail. Some days later, however, they con- 
descendingly sent a new list of ships which they promised would 
be ready in two weeks. A voluminous correspondence then arose 
over the fitting out of the squadron and the instructions for its 
commander. Although nearly four months had already been 
spent in preparations, the Admiralty had never been informed of 
the fleet's destination or of the amount of stores and provisions it 
was to carry to the islands. They raged and stormed ; but to no 
avail. The Lords of Trade knew as little as they did of the King's 
intentions, so could only reply that the orders were to send out 
several months' provisions with the troops and that several gov- 
ernors for the West India Islands were to take passage on the ships. 
The governors, however, had not yet been appointed. Then arose 
a protracted discussion over the instructions that were to be issued 
to the commander of the squadron. They were first considered in 
the month of October, approved a few days later, then recon- 
sidered, amended, further modified, and finally drafted early in 
December. But the troubles were not yet at an end. The 
victualling office in despair wrote that it could not obtain pro- 
visions, as it had not the money to pay for them, and the con- 
tractors refused to deliver anything " without ready money." 
So the Treasury had to be called upon to produce the desired 
funds ; but as it usually had none to produce, the question arises 
how the supplies were ever obtained. Next the Admiralty took 
offence because orders had been issued over its head to the com- 
mander of the squadron relative to the embarkation of the troops. 
More correspondence followed, more complications, until finally 
the expedition at last got to sea, March 8, 1690, after ten months 
of "preparation" (37). The squadron consisted of nine ships 
and two smaller vessels, under the command of Captain Lawrence 
Wright, an officer of 25 years' service, who had been in the West 
Indies before. Sailing from Plymouth, the vessels shaped their 
course toward the Leeward Islands, where a junction was to be 
effected with Governor Codrington's forces. But stormy weather 



i6i4 British Naval Operations in the West Indies 

so delayed and scattered the convoy that it was not until the last of 
May that they were all collected at Antigua, and then in so 
battered a state and with crews so sickly that a further delay was 
unavoidable. The governor was called upon to furnish troops to 
accompany the vessels on their coming cruise, but he had nothing 
wherewith to equip or arm them. The stores sent out with the 
squadron were so bad as to be utterly useless ; the muskets " are of 
no use," wrote Codrington in despair, and " as to the firelocks, 
the locks are very bad, the steel being so very soft that they are 
as likely to miss fire as not. Both matchlocks and firelocks are 
extraordinarily heavy, which is a great inconvenience in these hot 
countries." And to add to his troubles no good pistol powder had 
been sent out. " It is a great misfortune to us," added the gov- 
ernor, " that the officers entrusted with these matters have not 
been more careful." The regiments sent as reenforcements were 
almost in as deplorable condition; one whose strength had been 
mentioned as 930 men, was found to little exceed 500, while the 
wants of the men had been so " extremely neglected " that, as 
Governor Kendall wrote to the Earl of Shrewsbury, " we clothed 
the whole regiment which was naked before." The season was 
now far advanced, so much so that operations had to be begun 
immediately. Codrington added some soldiers to Wright's forces, 
and together the two began a series of depredatory expeditions. 
St. Christopher and St. Eustatius were first attacked. Men were 
landed, works captured, plantations plundered and houses burnt. 
But to hold the islands was out of the question ; the English force 
was far too small even to think of it. The coming of the hurri- 
cane season in July and sickness among the men now compelled 
the commanders to discontinue their operations until the month 
of October. Then Wright again put to sea (38), but with his 
complements so diminished by the fever that he was compelled to 
press men from merchant ships at Barbados. Plans had been 
made for an attack upon Guadeloupe. Misunderstandings, how- 
ever, and Wright's refusal to obey his orders and backwardness 
in seeking the enemy delayed the expedition until the close of 
March. Then the attempt was made, a landing was effected, and 
all was progressing well, when suddenly came the news of the 
arrival of a French fleet of 12 sail. This intelligence, following 
closely upon a bitter quarrel between the two commanders, was all 
that was needed to bring the expedition to a speedy end. Wright, 



British Naval Operations in the West Indies 1615 

broken in health, sailed for home ; some of his ships followed him 
with a convoy ; the others remained to protect the islands from the 
enemy (39). 

When Captain Wright returned to England, a new expedition 
under Captain Ralph Wrenn was immediately ordered to the West 
Indies to take his place. But it did not leave Plymouth until the 
close of December, 1691. Then, again, the force despatched was 
lamentably inadequate. We have already seen that the French 
had sent out 12 vessels. Yet Wrenn's force consisted of but five 
men-of-war, with troops, and a convoy of transports and vict- 
uallers. Perhaps the Admiralty had counted upon the vessels 
which Wright had left behind ; but some of these had in the mean- 
time fallen a prey to the French fleet, so that when Wrenn began 
operations in January, 1692, he found himself in possession of 
only seven vessels-of-war, and the enemy stronger than he had 
even supposed. In fact it was not long before he fell in with 
their entire fleet of 18 sail. In spite of the odds he fought his way 
clear and reached Barbados without the loss of a single ship. 
But he got no further. Sickness here overcame him and the 
greater part of his men, and such as survived reached England 
only after great hardships (40) . 

The failure of this second effort brought the officials to the 
realization of the fact that the conquest of the French in Ameri- 
can waters was not such an easy matter and that, if they were to 
succeed at all, expeditions of sufficient force must be sent out. 
Great preparations were therefore begun. An armada was now 
to be sent out that would destroy the French factories in New 
France, Canada and Quebec, dispossess the enemy of the New- 
foundland fisheries, and overwhelm their forces in the West 
Indies. The fleet was to be commanded by Captain Meese and to 
sail by the first of August, 1692 (41). The governors of Massa- 
chusetts and New York were notified to expect it in May or June 
of the year following and to collect troops to co-operate with the 
vessels immediately upon their arrival (42). But delays of one 
kind or another postponed the sailing, first, until the end of 
August, and then, till January, 1693 (43). Sir Francis Wheeler 
was now in command. The squadron (18 ships) finally reached 
Barbados in March — just three months too late. Even here 
more delays occurred. No preparations had been made by the 
officers in the Indies for any such operations as were intended 



i6i6 British Naval Operations in the West Indies 

by Wheeler's instructions. Before sufficient forces could be 
collected the month of March was over. Martinique was made 
the first objective. All the troops available and 1500 seamen were 
landed on the island. They ravaged the whole coast; then 
wondered what to do next. Their force was too weak to think of 
making an attempt on the French works. Still a council of war 
decided to attempt St. Pierre. The enemy were driven into their 
works but no further. Sickness broke out among the English 
forces. Eight hundred men went down with wounds or sickness 
in three days. Further operations under such conditions would 
have been sheer madness. A hasty retreat was therefore begun 
and St. Christopher sought as the least unhealthy spot for the 
men, but before the month of May was half over Wheeler had 
lost half his men and most of his officers (44) . . 

Codrington, the captain general of the Leeward Islands, next 
proposed an attack upon Guadeloupe, but Wheeler's orders were 
to leave the Indies by the end of May at the latest and proceed 
to Boston. Even here his vessels were followed by disease and 
death, and his men were refused permission to land lest they 
should bring their infections on shore. But the most stunning 
blow to Wheeler was the intelligence that the governor had had 
no intimation of his coming till the fleet arrived and that no troops 
were ready for an attack upon Canada. The letter from England 
(written on February 2, 1693) conveying the government's in- 
structions to the colonial governor on this subject had been sent by 
way of Virginia, and never reached him until July 24 ! In despair, 
Wheeler finally went to Newfoundland alone. But here al^^o the 
French were in too strong force to be attacked in a casual way, and 
he was obliged to return to England, where his ships arrived in 
October, but in so reduced a state that there were scarcely men 
enough to navigate them. Such was the end of the expedition 
from which so much had been expected (45). 

Over a year elapsed before another effort was made to dispute 
the command of the sea with France. Like its predecessors it was 
doomed to failure. The situation in the West India Islands was 
indeed desperate. Jamaica, nearly ruined by earthquake and 
pestilence, was unable to oppose even the privateers that hovered 
on her coasts and threatened her communications with the conti- 
nent. Daily the situation became more menacing. Governor 
Beeston implored aid; his forces were so depleted that he was 



British Naval Operations in the West Indies 1617 

practically at the mercy of the enemy and every moment dreading 
their approach (46). On June 17, 1694, the blow fell. Twenty 
ships and 3000 men under Monsieur Ducasse came from liis- 
paniola. Fortunately the governor had had warning of their 
coming some weeks before, thanks to the heroism of a merchant- 
skipper, then a prisoner at Petit Guavos, who made his escape 
in a small canoe over 300 miles of open sea to give the alarm in 
Jamaica. Beeston prepared for a gallant resistance, and wrote 
urgent messages to England, saying that without speedy succor, 
he should not be able to hold out long (47). The Committee on 
Plantations at once replied, August 3, 1694, that a force would 
soon sail to his relief, and proceeded to carry out these inten- 
tions (48). But the departmental administration in London was 
not so easily moved to haste. Both the Commissioners of the Navy 
and of the Admiralty were of the opinion that they had all they 
could attend to without sending expeditions to the West Indies. 
The Committee on Plantations then turned to the Commissioners 
of Transportation, but received little encouragement from their 
reports. Meanwhile it had been decided to raise two regiments, 
each of 600 men, which involved complicated estimates of ex- 
penses. Then followed a long correspondence with the Victual- 
ling Board as to feeding these men. This correspondence, natu- 
rally voluminous, became much more so because the Privy Council 
had named the force to be sent at 1600 men, whereas the Com- 
missioners on Plantations had placed it at 1700, and the Com- 
missioners of Transportation had been ordered to provide ships 
for 2000 men, and later for 1700. Then came the arrangements 
for appointment of a Commissary by the Treasury, to take charge 
of the military chest and for the supply of medical stores by 
Apothecaries' Hall. And lastly came the selection of the military 
commander who complicated matters still more by his demands. 
Preparations were well under way and everything was apparently 
progressing satisfactorily when difficulties arose in rapid suc- 
cession. First, all previous calculations were upset by a sudden 
increase of the number of troops to be sent out ; then their com- 
mander complained that not enough money, clothing or provisions 
had been furnished ; then the Victualling Board raged because the 
unexpected call for provisions came just as Admiral Russell's 
fleet was returning to port to revictual. A torrent of estimates 
and a volume of correspondence followed in the next two weeks. ' 



i6i8 British Naval Operations in the West Indies 

By this time the month of November was almost past. The 
expedition to have arrived in time should have sailed by the end 
of October. But moneys were not forthcoming from the Treas- 
ury, quite possibly because it had none to produce ; and the masters 
of the transports refused to obey their orders. Then the Com- 
missioners of Transportation discovered to their dismay that only 
1400 troops were going out, whereas they had provided passage 
for 1800, and they dreaded the unnecessary expense ; and to bring 
the comedy, or tragedy — for indeed it was a tragedy — to a close, 
the Admiralty neglected to provide any convoy at all. On January 
23, 1695, however, the expedition finally got to sea, and the 
" speedy succor " so unhesitatingly promised by the Commis- 
sioners of Plantations was on its way to Jamaica three months 
behind time (49). 

Before the vessels sailed, the King, who was greatly concerned 
at the failure of the three previous expeditions, summoned to his 
presence both Captain Wilmot and Colonel Lillingston, the naval 
and military commanders, and personally entreated them to co- 
operate in harmony during the coming operations. This they 
promised to do ; but before they had been at sea a week furious 
disputes and bitter jealousy over the question of prize money, 
which the King had ordered should be shared by both services, 
presaged ill for the results of their joint efforts. In fact Wilmot 
became so furious that he tried to be rid of Lillingston by in- 
veigling him ashore at Madeira. Failing in this, he next bribed the 
Treasury's commissary to wreck the military operations, so that 
the fleet, and he in particular, should have all the booty. 

The English commanders were instructed to co-operate with the 
Spanish in attacking the French settlements in the islands, so 
immediately upon their arrival in those waters Wilmot and 
Lillingston visited the Spanish governor at St. Domingo to 
arrange upon a plan of operations. St. Christopher was chosen 
as the first objective, and troops at once despatched there. Wil- 
mot, however, delayed the departure of his vessels for several 
days for no reason whatever, except the furtherance of his petty 
schemes, and when he reached the place chosen for the landing of 
the troops caused every difficulty imaginable. Lillingston, in 
spite of all obstacles, pushed on valiantly ; the French were com- 
pelled to abandon their works in haste, but not before setting the 
match to their magazine. Wilmot made a rush for the place to 



British Naval Operations in the West Indies 1619 

seize all the plunder before the troops could reach it. So pre- 
cipitate was he that one of his captains and several men were 
blown up by the train of powder left by the enemy. The troops, 
furious at being defrauded, were on the point of mutiny, and were 
with difficulty persuaded to serve longer. An attack on Port de 
Paix was next attempted. But Wilmot as usual stood in the way 
of success. He refused to land siege materials except at places 
miles away from the points chosen for batteries. In the face of 
such obstacles, the troops worked heroically, and the French were 
finally compelled to evacuate the fort. Lillingston took immediate 
possession of the place, whereupon Wilmot attacked him with a 
superior force and took away all the plunder. This brought all 
operations to an abrupt end. Lillingston and his men, more dead 
than alive, were in no condition to continue hostilities under these 
conditions, and Wilmot certainly had no intention of staying with 
them any longer. Intent upon making the most of his voyage, 
he continued his cruise alone. But he was not destined to see the 
fulfilment of his dreams. Before he was able to reach England, 
down came the yellow fever, sweeping away the commodore, his 
accomplices, and three-fourths of his force (50). 

The fate of Jamaica now appeared sealed. The helpless state 
of the island, its position and absolute inability to act in its own 
defence in case of danger, kept the inhabitants in continual fear 
for what was in store for them. Appeals to England for aid 
became more and more frequent (51). Yet no steps appear to 
have been taken by the authorities until November, 1696, when the 
disquieting intelligence came from France that a fleet was being 
fitted out for the West Indies. The Board of Trade immediately 
recommended the despatch of an engineer and fire-ships to pro- 
tect Jamaica. These " re-enforcements" arrived in due time, but 
as usual proved quite useless. Capable as the engineer may have 
been, he could not understand the needs of the island as well as the 
people themselves, and besides, of what use were an engineer and 
his fortifications when there was no money to build them or men to 
man them? The Board of Trade at last appear to have realized 
this, and urged upon the King (December 3, 1696) the necessity 
of sending out a squadron. Preparations were accordingly begun 
to carry out these orders, and, after the usual delays and con- 
fusions, Vice Admiral John Nevill was despatched in command 
of a sufficient force to foil the enemy's plans (52). But he 



i620 British Naval Operations in the West Indies 

arrived just too late. Cartagena had already been sacked, and the 
French fleet was on its way home laden with booty. Nevill had 
barely time to collect his forces and sail in pursuit ; but he was 
finally obliged to give over the chase without having been able to 
bring the enemy to action. He then shaped his course for Havana 
to consult with the governor as to providing convoy for the 
treasure fleet lying there. The Spaniard, however, had become 
suspicious of the English since Wilmot's behavior two years 
before, and would not even allow Nevill to enter the harbor. Then 
followed the same old story. The crews were overcome by a 
raging fever ; such great numbers died that Nevill steered for the 
Virginia coast in the hope of obtaining relief from the change of 
climate, but even here ill fortune pursued him, and he himself 
finally fell a victim of the plague (53). 

The peace of Ryswick now brought hostilities to a close. Four 
years of truce elapsed before the next outbreak. But these years 
were by no means years of peace for the plantations. A new evil 
far more terrible than any they had experienced now came upon 
them. This was the evil of piracy. Hundreds of sailors thrown 
out of employment and a host of desperadoes set free on the 
cessation of the more legitimate industry of privateering found 
this new occupation too tempting to resist. The era of buccaneer- 
ing, in which before this some patriotism at least had been evinced, 
was now followed by an era of unmitigated piracy. Some of the 
officials took early measures to stamp out the new evil, but in spite 
of the number of captures, it continued on the increase (54)- It 
cannot be said, however, that the inhabitants of the plantations 
were not wholly to blame in this matter; too often were they in 
league with the pirates and smugglers, and not infrequently did 
the officials show a suspicious tenderness for the law breakers 
(55). Even the very naval officers that were sent out to cruise 
against the buccaneers in some cases violated their orders to the 
point of using them as means for blackmailing the colonists and 
traders they were supposed to protect — a fact that none dared 
complain about, for they were powerless before the captains with 
armed forces at their backs, and besides the Admiralty was known 
to countenance their behavior (56). 

But even when the authorities were zealous in their efforts they 
found it extremely difficult to adopt repressive measures with the 
small forces at their command (57) . " Upon view of our stores," 



British Naval Operations in the West Indies 162 i 

wrote Governor Codrington from Antigua, " I find no ammuni- 
tion, it being- four or five years since the King sent us any 
powder," and no supplies had been received from the Victualhng 
Office, " so that for the last six weeks our two men-of-war have 
been useless" (58). The Governor of Barbados not long after 
complained that he had but one " heavy, crazy vessel, miscalled a 
cruiser," at his disposal (59), with which he was powerless to 
annoy the pirates, though the latter were all but annihilating the 
trade of Barbados, while Governor Stapleton of the Leeward 
Islands only once enjoyed the luxury of having a man-of-war 
under a good officer at his disposal (60). Cases even occurred 
where cruisers were obliged to take to their heels when encounter- 
ing the rovers (61) . Repeated appeals and demands for aid were 
sent to England (62), for piracy had reached such proportions 
that the entire legitimate trade of America was threatened with 
ruin. Practically a state of war existed (63). Spanish corsairs 
plundered English vessels without possibility of redress from the 
authorities into whose ports the captures were brought (64). So 
serious did the situation become that in August, 1687, the King 
commissioned Sir Robert Holmes to proceed with a squadron to 
the Caribbean and suppress the outlaws. A special proclamation 
was issued to insure a proper co-operation between him and the 
royal governors, but the task of the squadron proved far more 
serious than had been anticipated. The presence of the ships for 
a while checked the evil, but only for a time. Holmes' agents met 
with so much opposition from the faction which had gained the 
upper hand in Jamaica that they despaired of success. Warrants 
were even issued for Holmes' arrest, and the suit brought against 
him by the pirates resulted in his being thrown into gaol (65). 

The Board of Trade made every effort to obtain assistance for 
the traders, but it received little encouragement in answer to its 
recommendations. The Admiralty could not see the need for 
increased protection ; one vessel was already cruising in Virginia 
waters and four were stationed in the West Indies (66) . Besides, 
it could not spare the ships (67). The peace then reigning over 
Europe was but a momentary breathing spell; war might break 
out at any moment; it was therefore inadvisable to scatter the 
naval forces ; and besides there was the question of expense, as 
money was none too handy. There the matter was dropped, and 
the colonies were left to look out for themselves as best they could. 



i622 British Naval Operations in the West Indies 

The Admiralty's judgment with regard to the near approach of 
war was well-founded. A new cause for quarrel soon arose which 
culminated in the war of the Spanish Succession. The declara- 
tion of war came only on May 4, 1702, but preparations had not 
been delayed until then. King William's interest was not so much 
to dispute the claim of Philip as to seize such of the Spanish pos- 
sessions in America as would increase the commercial and colonial 
ascendancy of England. The main efforts of his fleets were to be 
directed against America. Subsequent causes led to a change in 
these plans. Before that decision had been reached, however, the 
Admiralty had already sent out a squadron of ten sail under Vice 
Admiral John Benbow. At the time of the arrival (November 3, 
1701) of this armament in the West Indies there were, as we have 
already seen, only a few English men-of-war in these waters, 
while the French and Spanish were in considerable force. But 
Benbow was fortunate in meeting the French squadron under M. 
Ducasse before the latter could effect a junction with his ally. 
Every advantage lay now with the English as they outnumbered 
their opponent. Benbow's captains, however, refused to engage 
the enemy, and the latter was allowed to escape after having been 
within the gasp of a superior force for five days (68). 

Four other expeditions were despatched to the West Indies 
during the course of the next eight years (69), but, like their 
predecessors, they, one and all, failed signally to accomplish their 
purpose, and after repeated disgraces, disasters, and tremendous 
expenditures of lives and money by England, the French were as 
formidable as ever. " When had we an opportunity or at least 
when was there any attempt made by us," wrote the Secretary of 
the Admiralty, Josiah Burchett, in 1704, " from the beginning of 
the last war to this very time, where the advantage proved in any 
degree equal to the charge and inconveniences that did attend it? 
The injuries we did the French when Sir Francis Wheeler com- 
manded in the West Indies were inconsiderable, and what have 
our successes been before and after that expedition? I doubt it 
was found that our squadrons came home in much worse condition 
than when they set forth, both as to men, and all other circum- 
stances; and not having the good fortune to do any sensible in- 
juries to our enemy, they had the satisfaction of knowing what 
inconveniences we involved ourselves in " (70) . And it was much 
in this way that most of the naval expeditions, even in the century 



British Naval Operations in the West Indies 1623 

following, were organized, until that greater War Minister, the 
elder Pitt, rose to power and accomplished what his predecessors 
never for one moment doubted their perfect competence to do. 



REFERENCES 

(i) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1693-96, p. 100; 1696-97, No. m, 768: 
1685-88, No. 1218, 1507, 1774, 1264, 849; Acts of the Privy Council 
II, 629; Hannay's Short History of the Royal Navy, II, 71-72. 

(2) Hannay, I, 184, 196; Oppenheim, A History of the Administration 

of the Royal Navy, I, 346-351 ; English Historical Review, IX, 
480; XI, 57. 

(3) Hannay, I, 309; Eng. Hist. Rev., XII, 21 ; Cal. Sta. Pap. (Dom.) 1660- 

61, p. no. 

(4) Monson, Naval Tracts, Book HI, p. 321. 

(5) Monson, Book HI, pp. 322-324; Hannay, I, 310-312. 

(6) House of Lords MSS., V, 269-290; 368-372. 

(7) Slyngesbie's Discourses of the Navy (Tanner), pp. ZZl-Z^- 

(8) Eng. Hist. Rev., XI, 60; Hannay, I, 317-318; Pepys' Diary (Wheatley), 

II, 37n, 258n, etc., etc. 

(9) Moorehouse, Samuel Pepys, p. 240. 

(10) Eng. Hist. Rev., XII, 679-681; Tanner, Descriptive Catalogue of the 

Naval Manuscripts in the Pepysian Library at Magdalene College, 

III, IX. 

(11) Pepys to Anglesey, July 31, 1675. 

(12) Moorehouse, p. 241. 

(13) Hannay, I, 447. 

(14) Eng. Hist. Rev., XIV, 47-49. 

(15) Idem XIV, 54- 

(16) Idem XIV, 53- 

(17) Idem XIV, 65; Hannay, I, 450-451. 

(18) Eng. Hist. Rev. XIV, 262. 

(19) Hannay, I, 197, 253. 

(20) Cal. Sta. Pap. (Dom.) 1660-61, pp. 364, 403, 603 ; Pepys' Diary, July 31, 

1660; June II, July 11, Aug. 14, 17, 31, Dec. 31, 166 1 ; Apr. 7, 1665; 
Jan. 26, Feb. 19, 1665-6; July 14, 1666; Apr. i, 1667. 

(21) Eng. Hist. Rev., XII, 42-43; Ho. Lds. MSS., V, 368-372. 

(22) Moorehouse, Life of Pepys, 90-91, 253. 

(23) Hannay, II, 1-3. 

(24) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1696-97, No. 508. 

(25) Ho. Lds. ,MSS., IV, 161, V, 475 ; Acts of the Privy Council, II, 174, 

285, 287, 296, 547, 606, 628, 629, 870, 882 ; Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 
1697-98, p. 8. 

(26) Acts of Privy Council, II, 629. 

(27) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1693-96, p. 473, No. 1807, No. 1884; 

1696-97, No. loi, No. 103, No. 859. 

(28) Hannay, II, n-T2. 



1624 British Naval Operations in the "West Indies 

(29) Cal. Sta. Pap. (Colonial) 1574-1660, p. 347, 348, 349, 351, 355, 356, 

357, 358, 359, 360, 362, 374. 

(30) Idem 419. 

(31) Hannay, I, 279-289. 

(32) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1661-68, No. 1204. 

(33) Amer. Hist. Rev., XVI? pp. 540-541; Beer, The Colonial System, 

I, 121 ; II, 59. 

(34) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1661-68, No. 1212, 1214, No. 1220, 1476, 

1477. 

(35) Idem No. 1484 ; Hannay, I, 386-388. 

(36) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1661-68, No. 1273, 1520, 1521, 1524, 1568, 

1569, 1570, 1584, 1596. 

(37) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1689-92, No. 90, loi, 106, 130, 146, 147, 

169, 263, 379, 386, 391, 419, 519, 527, 528, 533, 545, 552, 571, 581, 586' 
593, 617, 620, 733. 

(38) Note : Just before starting Wright was recalled to England by orders 

from home ; but at Barbados counter-orders were received with 
promises of re-inforcements. In January 1791, these " re-inforce- 
ments " came in the form of one man-of-war! (See Hannay, II, 
69-71.) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1689-92. 

(39) Idem No. 625, 927, 1004, 1034, 968, iioi, 1212, 1319, 1384, 1557, 1617, 

1621, pp. 402-404; Hannay, II, 69-71; Clowes, The Royal Navy, II, 
463- 

(40) Clowes, II, 466; Diet, of Natl. Biog., LXIII, 98; Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. 

& W. I.) 1689-92, No. 2025, 21 10. . 

(41) Ho. Lds. MSS., 1692-93, pp. 221, 222. 

(42) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1693-96, No. 48, 116. 

(43) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1689-92, No. 1775, 1787, 1804, 1829, 2457, 

2504. 

(44) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1693-96, No. 48, 116, 336, 276, 281, 296, 

338-340, 347- 

(45) Idem No. 410, 578, 48, I16, 545 ; Diet. Natl. Biog., LX, 444. 

(46) Idem No. 209, 334, 336, 359, 876, 1004. 

(47) Idem No. 329, 1109. 

(48) Idem No. 1189, 1223. 

(49) Cal. Sta. Pap. (Dom.) 1694-9S, P- 271. Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 

1693, 96, No. 1239, 1240, 1244, 1245, 1259-1264, 1280, 1301, 1302, 1313, 
1348, 1360, 1377, 1381, 1384, 1387, 1532, 1555, 1574, 1582, 1602. 

(50) Idem No. 1946, 1973, 1980, 1983, 2022, 2026, 2021, 2023, p. 554. 

(51) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1696-97, No. 97, 130, 163, 222, 232-234, 

508 ; Acts of Privy Council, II, 629. 

(52) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1696-97, No. 374, 391, 1080, 453- 

(53) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1696-97; No. 990; 1201, 1184; Diet. Natl. 

Biog., XL, 242 ; Clowes, II, 492. 

(54) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1699, p. XI, p. 69, No. 116; Cal. Sta. Pap. 

(A. & W. I.) 1685-88, No. 1127; Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1681- 
85, No. 1 168. 



British Naval Operations in the West Indies 1625 

(55) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1685-88, No. 1356, 1463, 1865, 1884, 678; 

1699, No. 116, p. 69. 

(56) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1696-97, No. 377, 461, 768; 1685-88, No. 

849, 1264, 1218, 1507, 1774. 

(57) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1681-85, No. 572, 602, 607, 684, 762. 

(58) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1696-97, No. 859. 

(59) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1699, No. 72. 

(60) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1681-85, No. 1147, 1168. 

(61) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1699, No. 711. 

(62) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1699, No. 239, 340, 395; 1685-88, No. 1210. 

(63) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1681-85, No. 963, 992, 668, 1938; 1685-88; 

No. 1276, 1278, 1406. 

(64) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1685-88, No. 1958, 1962, 1964, 1991, 2000, 

218, 269, 569, 591, 609, 706, 739. 

(65) Idem No. 1463, 1602, 141 1, 1508, 1602, 1865, 1884. 

(66) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1697-98, No. 8, 499. 

(67) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1699, No. 29, 42. 

(68) Clowes, II, 367. 

(69) Clowes, II, 373, 502 ; Ho. Lds. MSS., V, 462. Diet. Natl. Biog., XXIII, 

28 ; XXIX, 330 ; LX, 453 ; LVIII, 7,72. 

(70) Hannay, II, 68. 



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